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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest 
of CASE NO. 15947 
P.L.L., a person under 18 
years of age. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from an order of Judge L. Kent 
Bachman of the First Judicial District Juvenile Court for 
Weber County, Utah terminating appellant's parental rights 
to her child P.L.L. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On June 22, 1978 appellant's parental rights to her 
child P.L.L. were terminated by order of the juvenile court. 
(R.8l) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant desires an order from the Utah Supreme 
Court setting aside the juvenile court's order terminating her 
parental rights to her child P.L.L. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1973, while married to Robert Lavine, appellant 
gave birth, on July 10, 1973, to her minor daughter P.L.L. 
(TR. 207) The child was born with serious medical problems 
including a severe cleft palate. (TR. 163) As a result, the 
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child was placed, at birth, in a foster home of the Utah 
Division of Family Services. (hereafter DFS) From the 
child's birth until November, 1973 no visitation was arranged 
between parents and child. 
During November, 1973 Mr. David Mullens, a DFS 
caseworker, acquired the case. (TR. 69) He was in charge of 
the case until April or May, 1974. (TR.70) Mr. Mullens 
promptly arranged a visit between appellant and child during 
November, 1973. (TR.78) A second visitation took place on 
January 18, 19}4 (TR.78) followed by at least two more 
visitations between January 18, 1974 and March, 1974. (TR.78) 
Several other scheduled visitations were cancelled from time 
to time because either appellant, her husband, or the child 
were sick and unable to attend the scheduled visitations. (TR.· 
Although the child's medical problems required that the child 
remain in DFS custody for approximately a year and one-half it 
was Mr. Mullens long range goal to put the child back into 
appellant's home if the appellant was able to manage the 
necessary care for the child. (TR.79) Indeed, Mr. Mullens 
acknowledged that had the child not been a handicapped child I 
I 
efforts would have been made much sooner to put the child intc I 
I 
appellant's home. (TR.80) Also, during Mr. Mullens involveme":\ 
with the case no instruction was given appellant on how to ca~/ 
for her handicapped child (TR.80) nor were any steps spelled 
out to appellant to be performed in order for appellant to 
obtain custody of her child (TR.79) 
-2-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DFS caseworker, Vickie Rowe, assumed management of 
the case in either June or July, 1974. (TR.84) She was 
responsible for the case until approximately June, 1975. (TR.84) 
During the two month interim period between David Mullens 
relinquishment of the case and Vickie Rowe's assumption of case 
management there were two more visitations between parent and 
child. (TR.lOB) Those visits went well, with appellant's 
concerned about and relating well to her child. (TR.l07) 
While Mrs. Rowe was in charge of the case numerous, periodic 
visits were arranged between appellant and her child. Some 
visits during Vickie Rowe's administration of the case were 
quite successful. Other visits during this period were less 
successful. 
An initial visit under Vickie Rowe's supervision took 
place on August 1, 1974 for about three hours. (TR.86) Nothing 
unusual about appellant's care of the child was noted after 
this visit. (TR.BG) A second visitation took place from 
August 6-7, 1974 (TR.87) followed by two more overnight 
visitations on August 27 and September 17, 1974 (TR.92) 
Thereafter, a weeks long visitation occurred from October 22-
29, 1974. (TR.96) A sixth visitation was arranged for 
December 25, 1974 (TR.l02) and again on January 13, 1975. 
The last visit under Ms. Rowe's supervision took place on 
March 29, 1975. The two month gap in visitation resulted 
from an illness of the child. (TR.l03) Ms. Rowe also testified 
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that she could recall three or four occasions when the appell 
had requested visitation with her child which had been denied 
because the child was ill. (TR.lOl) Then, after the Easter, 
March 29, 1974 visitation, Ms. Rowe's notes reflected that 
the appellant had contacted her twice more seeking visitation 
but again, P.L.L. was ill and unable to visit with appellant. 
(TR.l05) 
While Ms. Rowe did instruct the appellant on how to 
care for the child when the child was left at the appellant's 
home, Ms. Rowe had not had any previous training or experience 
in working with a mother of limited intelligence. (TR. 109-101 
Other than from her immediate supervisor, Ms. Rowe did not 
seek any other more qualified professional help in terms of 
training appellant in the skills appellant would need in order 
to gain custody of her child or improve the quality of care 
appellant was giving her child. (TR.llO) The only referral 
made by Ms. Rowe seeking outside training for appellant was 
to the Weber County Mental Health parenting classes which 
appellant attended regularly from October 29 through December 
2, 1974. (TR.ll3) It is significant to note that the quality 
of care appellant provided to her child during and after she 
attended the parenting classes improved considerably. (TR.lOl-~ 
Again, there was a two month span during which the 
case was managed byonePat Purcell, another DFS caseworker. 
No visitations between parent and child nor contacts by DFS 
with appellant were recorded. 
-4-
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In September, 1975 Ms. Deola Gearhart, yet another 
DFS caseworker, assumed responsibility for the case of P.L.L. 
(TR.l24) Ms. Gearhart's first contact with appellant was on 
October 15, 1975 when appellant went to Ms. Gearhart's office 
and requested visitation with her child. Visitation was 
arranged and took place on October 17, 1975. (TR. 125) 
Appellant again contacted Ms. Gearhart on November 28, 1975 
requesting a Christmas visitation which occurred on December 
24-25, 1975. This Christmas visitation itself went well 
with no apparent problems being discernible. (TR.l29) Between 
these two visitations Ms. Gearhart made no efforts at all to 
contact appellant or to arrange any visitation. (TR.l27) 
Indeed, from taking over the case it was Ms. Gearhart's position 
that all of the responsibility for initiating contacts between 
DFS and a parent rested upon the parent (TR. 268-69) and the 
result of no contacts only goes to prove the parent not inter-
ested in the welfare of the child. (TR. 269) 
At least as early as January, 1976, Ms. Gearhart had 
made a conscious decision that appellant's parental rights to 
P.L.L. should be terminated. (TR. 142) As a result no steps 
were ever taken by DFS to work with appellant to correct any 
inadequacies in appellant's home. (TR. 131, 134) Indeed, by 
December 9, 1975, Ms. Gearhart was already taking active ,steps 
to terminate appellant's parental rights (TR.l55) From 
December 25, 1975 until March, 1977 appellant had no further 
visitations with her daughter, although there was testimony 
from Ms. Gearhart that she did have one occasion to discuss 
-5-
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this with appellant and appellant indicated to Ms. Gearhart 
that someone had told appellant she wasn't allowed to visit 
her child. (TR. 130-31) 
On January 10, 1977 the juvenile court scheduled 
a review of DFS custody of P.L.L. Appellant appeared at that 
hearing and requested custody of her child. (R. 27) A hearing 
on the custody question was scheduled for February 14, 1977 
but that hearing was continued because the county attorney 
couldn't appear on that day. The hearing was reset for 
March 2, 1977~ (R.30) At the conclusion of the March 2, 1977 
hearing the court entered the following order: 
That the Division of Family Services prepare 
a report as to the type and cost of the surgery 
P will need. Further, that this matter be and 
is hereby continued to the 15th day of March, 1977 
at 9 a.m. Further, the above named child's grand-
parents may visit with said child for a half a day 
every other week. Visitation with the mother is 
to be worked out between the mother and the Division 
of Family Services. (R. 34) 
Custody of the child was denied to appellant. Also, the 
respective grandparents of P.L.L. who had also sought custody 
of the child were denied custody because while both sets of 
grandparents had suitable homes, the juvenile court felt 
the specialized medical needs of the child beyond the capa-
bilities of the grandparents. (R. 36) 1 
Visitation between P.L.L. and the grandparents follo>1 
the March, 1977 court hearings. These visitations extended 
into May, 1977. (TR. 144) Ms. Gearhart was completely aware 
that appellant would also be present at the respective grand-
-6-
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parent's home to have visitation with her daughter on those 
days. (TR. 146) However, at this point, Ms. Gearhart uni-
laterally stopped these previously court ordered visitations 
(TR. 146-48) despite repeated calls from the grandparents 
attempting to exercise their court ordered visitation rights. 
(TR. 256) These steps were followed on November 28, 1977 by 
the filing of a petition seeking termination of the parental 
rights of appellant. (R.41) A denial was entered on January 
18, 1978 (R. 78) and trial set for March 30, 1978. That 
trial setting was vacated because the state failed to file 
responses to the appellant's discovery requests. (R. 78) 
Another trial setting was made for April 27, 1978 and again 
vacated because of the states failure to respond to appellant's 
discovery requests. On April 12, 1978, appellant had filed 
a motion to dismiss the state~ petition seeking termination 
of parental rights. (R. 65) but the state was permitted to 
respond and trial reset for May 18, 1978. That setting was 
again vacated because DFS would not grant access to subpoenaed 
records from DFS files. (R. 79) Finally, On June 15, 1978 
trial was held resulting in the termination order. (R. 79-80) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDING IS 
AN ADULT CASE, AND A FORFEITURE PROCEEDING OF A 
QUASI-CRIMINAL NATURE TO WHICH THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION MUST APPLY. 
THEREFORE, IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO REQUIRE 
APPELLANT TO TESTIFY AGAINST HERSELF. 
-7-
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Section 78-3a-48 (1) (a) permits the juvenile court 
to decree a termination of parental rights with respect to 
one or both parents if the court finds: 
(a) That the parent or parents are unfit or 
incompetant by reason of conduct or condition 
seriously detrimental to the child; 
While the proceedings to accomplish a termination of parental 
rights are denominated "civil proceedings" Section 78-3a-44 (1) I 
U.C.A. 1953 as amended, the juvenile court is actually a 
specialized, hybred, court system invested with statutory 
authority to ~tilize, from time to time, both the civil and 
criminal procedural rules. Section 78-3a-19 gives the juv~ni~~ 
court jurisdiction to try adults for criminal offenses committe. 
against children, furthermore, Section 78-3a-20 states: 
In proceedings in adult cases the practice 
and procedure of the juvenile court shall conform 
to the practice and procedure provided by law or 
rule of court for criminal proceedings may be 
commenced by complaint and a trial jury shall 
consist of four jurors .••• 
It is the examination into the wrongful conduct or condition 
of the parent or parents which gives the quasi criminal nature 
to termination proceedings otherwise denominated "civil." 
Because it is the wrongful conduct or condition 
of the parent, seriously detrimental to the child, which is 
actually on trial in a termination proceeding, a termination 
case must properly be looked at as primarily an adult case 
rather than a child's case. This court has begun to recognize 
this point. In State of Utah, in the interest of Walter B., 
577 P.2d 119, 124-25 (1978) this court stated: 
-8-
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The statute does not provide that termination 
may be predicated on the best interests of the 
child; this is a standard applicable to a 
custody disposition. The best interests of the 
child may be a resulting benefit, but it ca~not 
be the primary point of departure, upon which 
termination hinges. 
Obviously, the primary point of departure upon which a 
termination may hinge is the wrongful conduct or conditions 
of the parent or parents, seriously detrimental to the child. 
In substance then, a termination proceeding in the 
juvenile court is actually a forfeiture proceeding whereby 
a parent may be required to forfeit the parent-child relation-
ship. Upon a showing of wrongful conduct or condition on 
the part of a parent which cannot or will not be corrected 
by the parent, after notice and opportunity implemented, by 
reasonable efforts of assistance, the juvenile court may 
require a forfeiture of the parent-child relationship. 
Nearly a century ago the United Stated Supreme 
Court decided Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
That case dealt with a situation where the government was 
seeking a forfeiture of property alleged to have been fraud-
ulently imported without paying the necessary duties. The 
forfeiture proceedings in Boyd were, like in our juvenile 
court, denominated civil proceedings. The Supreme Court 
stated at 622: 
... We are also clearly of opinion that pro-
ceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring 
the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of 
offenses committed by him, though they may be 
-9-
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civil in form, are in their nature criminal ... 
As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures, 
incurred by the commission of offenses against 
the law are of this quasi criminal nature, we 
think that they are within the reason of criminal 
proceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution, and of that portion 
of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no 
person shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself ... 
In accord with Boyd, the United States Supreme Court decided 
the more recent case of United States v. United States Coin 
and Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) which also dealt with a 
forfeiture proceeding. In United States Coin and Currency 
the government has instituted a forfeiture proceeding to 
obtain money seized from a person's possession at the time 
of his arrest for violating federal gambling registration and 
tax statutes. The court in citing Boyd, supra reiterated that: 
proceedings instituted for the purpose of 
declaring the forfeiture of a man's property 
by reason of offences committed by him, though 
they may be civil in form, are in their nature 
criminal. 
Therefore, a Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimin-
ation must apply where money liability is predicated upon a 
finding of the owner's wrongful conduct. United States v. 
United States Coin and Currency, supra, at 718. 
For a termination of parental rights to be ordered 
by the juvenile court the evidence must show wrongful conduct 
or condition of the parent extending beyond simple neglect 
or dependency, which is "such a substantial departure from 
the norm as to constitute a condition seriously detrimental 
-10-
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to the child." State of Utah, in the interest of Walter B., 
supra, at 121. It is the examination of the wrongful conduct 
or conditions of the parent, seriously detrimental to the 
child, that invests the termination proceeding with the 
quasi criminal aspects similar to the forfeiture of property 
proceedings set out in Boyd and United States Coin and Currency. 
This brings the termination proceeding within the purview of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination for 
civil proceedings as spelled out in Boyd and United States 
Coin and Currency. 
In State of Utah, in the interest of Walter B. supra, 
at 124 this court stated, "A parent has a fundamental right, 
protected by the constitution, to sustain his relationship 
with his child." If a Fifth Amendment privilege against self 
incrimination can be said to attach in a civil forfeiture 
proceeding involving property certainly the privilege must 
apply in a civil forfeiture proceeding involving the fundamental 
Constitutional right to the parent-child relationship. 
POINT II 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL FAILED TO ESTABEISH 
THAT APPELLANT WAS REASONABLY NOTIFIED OF ALLEGED 
INADEQUACIES IN THE ENVIRONMENT SHE PROVIDED FOR 
HER CHILD; AND, FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT REASONABLE 
EFFORTS OF ASSISTANCE WERE EXTENDED BY DFS TO 
APPELLANT TO CORRECT ANY INADEQUACIES ALLEGED TO 
EXIST IN APPELLANT'S ABILITY TO CARE FOR HER CHILD. 
State v. Lance, 464 P.2d 395 (1970) and State of 
Utah, in the interest of Walter B., 577 P.2d 119 (1978) have 
firmly established that "it is a condition precedent to 
-11-
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termination that the conduct or condition alleged to be 
seriously detrimental to the child cannot be corrected, after 
notice and opportunity implemented, by reasonable efforts of 
assistance." State of Utah, in the interest of Walter B., ~~ 
at 124. 
In reaching its decision to terminate appellant's 
parental rights to P.L.L., the juvenile court placed heavy 
reliance upon the fact that while training might assist the 
mother in providing basic survival care for her child, that 
it would not enable appellant to provide her child with proper 
parental care and protection. (R. 91) This finding has 
two fundamental errors. First, no legitimate steps were 
ever undertaken to diagnose appellant's strengths or alleged 
inadequacies in providing adequate care for her child, nor 
was any such information properly made known to appellant. 
Secondly, no legitimate efforts, which failed, were ever 
made to extend reasonable assistance to appellant to overcome 
her weaknesses and build upon her strengths in caring for her 
child as a condition precedent to termination. 
Testimony at trial revealed that only DFS caseworker 
Vickie Rowe gave appellant some basic types of positive in-
structions on how to care for the child in terms of feeding, 
I 
clothing and bathing the child. It was these brief instructionJ 
sessions, as Ms. Rowe dropped the child off with appellant for 
visitation, that the juvenile court relied upon in finding, 
as a condition precedent to termination, that appellant had 
been informed of inadequacies in the environment she was 
providing for the child. ~lso, that these instructional 
-12-
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sessions constituted reasonable efforts of assistance to 
appellant to correct the alleged seriously detrimental conduct 
or conditions. (TR. 290) In reaching this finding, the court 
discounted entirely the very significant factor that Ms. Rowe 
had absolutely no training or past experience at all that 
would have qualified her to be able to adequately convey to 
and instruct appellant about alleged inadequacies in appellant's 
ability to care for her child. (TR. 109-10) This of course, 
is significant because with a parent of limited intellectual 
abilities a legitimate question arises as to whether or not 
brief and hastily given instructions on child care would be 
adequately comprehended. To have assured that appellant was 
fully informed about and actually understood DFS complaints 
about alleged inadequacies in her abilities to care for her 
child qualified professional help should have been brought 
into the case to assure that appellant did fully understand 
her alleged inadequacies and would thereby receive a bona fide 
chance to correct the inadequacies. 
The far more important failure in this case however, 
was the failure of DFS to extend reasonable efforts of assistance 
to appellant to correct the alleged conduct or condition 
seriously detrimental to the child prior to seeking an order 
of termination of parental rights. Again, the juveni,le court 
relied solely upon the brief instructional sessions by Vickie 
Rowe as constituting the reasonable assistance required under 
the circumstances. The question then becomes was this in fact 
-13-
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reasonable assistance under the circumstances? 
Both psychologists who testified aL trial agreed 
that appellant has the ability to provide her child with 
basic survival care. (Dr. Furlong-TR.42; Dr. Grow-TR.65-66) 
If a parent possesses the capability, without training, to 
provide basic survival care enabling the child to survive 
but not necessarily thrive or be adequately stimulated, 
reasonable assistance as a pre-condition to seeking termination 
would require that some additional steps be undertaken in 
terms of supplemental training to determine if the parent can 
be trained sufficiently to provide an even better level of 
care for her child. 
It is submitted that the capacity to provide basic 
survival care is in itself sufficient to defeat a termination 
petition because, as acknowledged by Dr. Furlong in his 
testimony to the court, the situation of a parent raising a 
child in basic survival conditions is not that uncommon. 
(TR. 43) Therefore, that factor is not such a departure from 
the norm as to fall within the legislative meaning of seriously 
detrimental to the child. However, separate and apart from 
the ability to provide basic survival skills no efforts at 
all were made to increase the appellant's ability to provide 
a better quality level of care for her child. Indeed, no, one 
was able to render a realistic opinion as to whether or not 
appellant could or could not be helped to raise the level 
of her ability to care for her child because no such efforts 
-14-
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had been made. When Dr. Furlong was asked the direct question, 
his response was "Well, I don't know, I honestly don't know." 
(TR. 45) Far too much uncertaintly exists on such an important 
question. 
As a condition precedent to termination basic 
fairness requires that appellant be given a reasonable 
opportunity to have the child in her horne, absent wilful 
neglect or abuse, with qualified professional supervision 
and training before she be deemed to be unable to correct 
conduct or conditions which might otherwise preclude her 
from having custody or maintaining parental rights to her 
child. The petition to terminate parental rights was for 
this reason premature under these particular circumstances. 
The juvenile court's order should be vacated and the case 
remanded to the juvenile court with instructions that bona 
fide efforts be made to assist appellant in caring for her 
child as a condition precedent to seeking a termination in this 
case. 
POINT III 
THE INADEQUACIES OF CONDUCT OR CONDITION ALLEGED 
TO BE SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL TO THE CHILD ARE NOT 
SUCH SUBSTANTIAL DEPARTURES FROM THE NORM AS TO 
SUSTAIN A DECREE OF TERMINATION. 
In In the interest of Winger, 558 P.2d 1311, 1316 
(1976) quoting State v. McMaster, 468 P.2d 567 (1971) the 
Utah Supreme Court adopted the position that in order for a 
termination of parental rights to be sustained the conduct or 
condition ascribed to the parent must be such a substantial 
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departure from the norm as to constitute a condition 
seriously detrimental to the child. The evidence in the pre-
sent case failed to establish conduct or condition on the 
part of the appellant which was such a substantial departure 
from the norm that a termination can be sustained. 
Viewing the evidence presented at trial in a light 
most favorable to the state, it showed only that the appellant 
is borderline mentally retarded thereby limiting her ability 
to care for her child. There was no evidence at all that 
the appellant had ever willfully neglected or abused her chiN 
at any time. 
On the question of the conduct or condition of the 
appellant being a substantial departure from the norm the 
testimony of Dr. Furlong, who testified on behalf of the 
state, is of particular importance. This testimony is containeJ 
generally in pages 40-43 of the trial transcript. In partic~u 
Dr. Furlong testified: (TR. 42-42) 
Q: And at that time do you recall telling me that 
it was your opinion that Mary Lavine could provide P , the 
Child, with basic survival care? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And is it your opinion from testing her that 
she could provide basic survival care for the child? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What's that mean? 
A: Well, it means that the child likely would 
survive, would not necessarily thrive or be adequately 
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stimulated, but would survive. 
Q: Now, is that type of situation an uncommon 
circumstance around the country as far as you know? 
A: I would think it's not uncommon. (emphasis added) 
If it is not uncommon that throughout the country there are 
many parents of skills and abilities comparable to appellant 
who, although capable of providing only basic survival care, 
are raising their children under similar conduct and conditions 
this, while unfortunate, does not establish such a substantial 
departure from the norm justifying a termination of parental 
rights. 
POINT IV 
THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES IS ESTOPPED 
FROM SEEKING A TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
HEREIN BECAUSE DFS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN A DE-
LIBERATE PLAN CALCULATED TO DESTROY APPELLANT'S 
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP. 
Through the summer of 1975, appellant regulqrly 
maintained contact and visitation with her daughter. At 
this point in time Ms. Deola Gearhart was given management of 
the case. Ms. Gearhart acknowledged on cross-examination 
that she initiated no steps whatever to attempt to build or 
maintain the parent-child relationship between appellant 
and her daughter. (TR. 144) It was her view that responsibility 
for arranging visitation between appellant and her child 
rested solely on the appellant. Further, even after the 
juvenile court had ordered in March, 1977, that visjtation 
between grandparents and P.L.L. and appellant and her daughter 
take place, Ms. Gearhart deliberately and unilaterally term-
inated the visitation because in her sole judgment the visits 
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were upsetting the child. (TR. 145) These visitations were 
terminated even though Ms. Gearhart knew that appellant was 
seeing her child when the child would be taken to the home of 
the respective grandparents. (TR.l46) The visitations, after 
being unilaterally terminated in late summer, 1977, were not 
resumed. 
The deliberate policy of DFS, specifically Ms. 
Gearhart, in trying to build a favorable record sufficient to 
support a decree of termination is clearly demonstrated by 
Ms. Gearhart's answers to cross-examination on pages 155 and 
156 of the trial transcript. In June, 1976, Ms. Gearhart 
filled out a Social Services Contract which detailed her 
plan for handling this case. The document said "Mother's 
visits will be limited and closely supervised." This work 
plan was entered with the knowledge that it takes continuous 
and active interaction between a mother and daughter under 
these circumstances to foster any sort of parent-child 
relationship. 
The chronicled actions of Ms. Gearhart permitted 
DFS to place appellant in a catch-22 type situation. The 
reasoning goes - parental rights can be terminated because 
appellant has not visited her child and therefore, has no 
interest in the child - because the child isn't visited by 
appellant this is seriously detrimental to the child permitting 
termination - however, the appellant can't see her child be-
cause DFS won't let her see her child, or refuses to initiate 
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any steps to maintain the relationship. By failing to 
attempt to maintain or build appellant's relationship with 
her child, DFS clearly violated appellant's fundamental 
right to maintenance of a family relationship. In this 
circumstance DFS must not be permitted to profit by its 
intentional and wrongful inaction. 
CONCLUSION 
As has been pointed out many times, termination of 
parental rights is a very drastic and extreme action to be 
taken against a parent and then only in the most serious 
cases. It is a step which should not be taken at all until 
it can be conclusively shown that a parent cannot or will not 
correct the conduct or conditions alleged seriously detrimental 
to the child. It is not an action which should be based 
upon conjecture and supposition as has been done in this instance. 
The mother must, as a precondition to termination, be given 
a bona fide chance to have the child in her custody, with 
proper and adequate supervision in order to determine whether 
or not conduct or conditions alleged seriously detrimental 
to the child can be corrected. This not having been done in 
this case, the termination proceeding was premature and 
cannot be sustained. 
DATED this ~ay of fi.ct-?n-6-t-1./ ' 19 7 8. 
Respectfully submitted, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
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